
With the tremendous increase in available lawbooks in recent years, most lawyers have developed an expertise in sales resistance to multivolume offerings—perhaps a response at least in part spawned by economic necessity. It is to be hoped that any lawyer who is initially tempted to turn down Mr. Winard’s Landmark Papers on Estate Planning, Wills, Estates and Trusts will, on further reflection, change his mind. Such a change of position will never, in this reviewer’s opinion, cause any pangs of regret.

Volume I, devoted to estate planning, sets the tone for the entire work with Joseph Trachtman’s “Maxims for Estate Planners”, containing such gems right on the first page as this: “Do not call yourself an ‘estate planner’. To be a lawyer is honor enough.” Mr. Trachtman’s brief article should be required reading on an annual basis, at least for those who practice in this field.

Many outstanding authorities have one or more articles appearing in these volumes. Names such as Austin Wake- man Scott, Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Christian M. Lauritzen II, Edward C. King and others indicate the high quality of work which must have gone into the preparation of the very helpful material collected by Mr. Winard. Any lawyer, trust officer, insurance man or anybody else who works in the estate field owes it to himself and his clients to take advantage of the fine opportunity made available in convenient form by Mr. Winard.

—GIBSON GAYLE, JR.


It has long been apparent even to those who give the matter only cursory attention that the attitude and disposition of the United States power elite vis-à-vis Russia and the reciprocal attitude of the Russians toward the United States will determine whether the world as we know it will survive this century. By this touchstone, Robert S. McNamara, for seven years Secretary of Defense under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, is an outstanding example of a temperate and moderate attitude toward the occasionally intractable Russian colossus. Mr. McNamara points out that the Russians opposed Castro’s policy of externally supported insurrection; Russia took the initiative in bringing about peace between India and Pakistan in 1965 and was generally constructive in its behavior during the Laotian crisis and the Sino-Indian border dispute. The former Secretary of Defense does not buy the idea that a Communist conspiracy is at the bottom of the world’s ferment. “It would be a gross oversimplification to regard Communism as the central factor in every conflict throughout the under-developed world.”

The speeches and press interviews of Robert S. McNamara do not disclose the flavor and stature of the man as this book does. For instance, there is a better argument against the increase of our weaponry than the following statement: “Were we to deploy a heavy ABM System throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage.” He points out that in the end neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would have greater relative nuclear capabil-
Mr. McNamara points out that the peace so long established between Canada and the United States rests on compatible beliefs, common principles and shared ideals. He finds a direct and constant relationship between incidence of violence and economic status among countries in conflict. It bodes ill for the future safety of the world, in the author's view, that the per capita income of one half of the eighty undeveloped nations that are members of the World Bank, of which he now is president, is rising at the minuscule rate of 1 per cent a year or less. McNamara's solution to this gnawing and potentially explosive problem is eminently sane. "Just as collective security is the only sensible military strategy in a half-free and half-totalitarian world, so collective developmental assistance is the only sensible economic strategy in a half-fed and half-famished world. Collective security and collective development are but two faces of the same coin."

For a statesmanlike, clear and coherent view of the world of the 1970s and some of the options still open to those with an unjaundiced view, this book is enthusiastically recommended.

—Leonard M. Salter


This is a Foreign Policy Research Institute book containing a history of the performance of political treaties by the United States and European nations.

With respect to every important political treaty entered into by European nations and the United States from 1661 through 1965, the author inquires whether the treaty was performed or breached. He finds that the practically universal experience has been that political treaties are performed only so long as adherence to them advances the national interests of the signatories or the selfish interests of the governments in power. Even our own country has breached treaties when their performance ceased to advance our national interests. The record is so consistently bad that the author calls treaty reliance a disease which frequently has been and can become fatal to those countries which suffer from it.

In a foreword, William R. Kintner, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, praises the book for the soundness of the research on which its findings are based and as an original and important contribution to the security and protection of our country.

It is also a most timely contribution since President Nixon has announced that our country is entering a period of "negotiation" in international affairs and has stated repeatedly his eagerness to open negotiations with the Soviet Union for treaties looking to the reduction of nuclear arms. In fact, one of the primary arguments of the Nixon Administration for the installation of the antiballistic missile system is that authorization of the system and appropriation of the money needed to install it will improve the bargaining position of the United States in such negotiations and that, if a satisfactory treaty is agreed upon, the plan for installation of the system can then be abandoned.

In other words, the argument suggests that we should then rely upon performance of the treaty by Russia for our protection instead of upon our arms superiority. History, as set forth in this book, proves the dangers and unwisdom of such reliance and the risks involved in its application to our security.

This book is a "must" for all those officials in our government who contribute to the determination of foreign policy or to the development of the weaponry essential to the protection and security of our country. All who seek to keep informed on topics of national interest in order to use their voices, pens and votes to protect the security of our country and to save our people from enslavement by its enemies should read this book.

—Walter H. Moses